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 1 
In the traumatic and somber aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. 
Congress passed a critical piece of legislation to provide the president authority to defend the 
United States and its interests abroad. The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which 
responded to the horrors of 9/11, began the United States’ longest war—the global war on terror—
and serves as its legal basis today. President George W. Bush signed the AUMF into law on 
September 18, 2001, only a week after the attacks. Congress agreed with the proposition:  
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on Sept. 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.1 
 
The AUMF enabled President Bush to defend the United States against al-Qa’ida and other entities 
that carried out 9/11. Congress rejected the Bush administration’s first draft of the legislation 
because they believed it was too expansive. The initial wording provided the president with 
authority “to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression,”2 which Congress 
rejected on the grounds that such language would provide the Executive Branch with power at the 
expense of Congress. Congress rejected other requests from the Bush administration, including 
one to transfer appropriations power to the president, and another that restricted Congress’ access 
to classified briefings. The Bush administration also asked for authority to waive restrictions on 
foreign assistance without notifying Congress, which could unilaterally override Congressional 
mandates not to assist countries who commit human rights violations, cause nuclear proliferation, 
and sponsor terrorism.3 As David Abramowitz, the Democratic Chief Counsel of the House 
Committee on International Relations, explained at the time, “the requests from the White House 
in response to this crisis were particularly breathtaking, and the results of many of these proposals 
were far narrower than those put forth initially by the President.”4 In other words, the rejection by 
a Congress of expanded executive authority guarded the separation of powers. 
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Although Congress diluted the Bush administration’s original proposals by rejecting what 
Representatives viewed as unreasonable expansions of executive authority, the AUMF still 
authorized an entirely new security apparatus designed to fight terrorism. This apparatus has 
impacted nearly all aspects of the federal government and has created a new power dynamic in 
public policy. For example, at least 263 organizations have been created or reorganized in response 
to 9/11 (e.g. The Department of Homeland Security).5 Additionally, the Bush and Obama 
administrations’ justification for policies like the detention of “enemy combatants” in Guantanamo 
Bay, drone strikes, and mass data collection, all derive from or were catalyzed by the AUMF. 
Because it remains the preeminent legal basis for the U.S. global war on terror, the AUMF 
influences how the United States employs force, cooperates with foreign countries, and treats civil 
liberties. Today, these subjects create antagonistic international debates about U.S. foreign policy. 
Yet, while the law’s impact now sparks controversy, the 2001 debate in Congress was almost 
entirely devoid of disagreement.  
 The AUMF garnered unanimity in the Senate with only one dissenting vote in the House 
of Representatives. The sole “nay” came from Rep. Barbara Lee, a Democrat from California. On 
the floor of the House of Representatives three days after 9/11, Lee argued that  
We must not rush to judgment. Far too many innocent people have already died. Our country is in mourning. 
If we rush to launch a counter-attack, we run too great a risk that women, children, and other non-combatants 
will be caught in the crossfire.6  
 
Lee reminded the House how the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution justified a long and undeclared 
war in Vietnam. She remarked, “we must be careful not to embark on an open-ended war with 
neither an exit strategy nor a focused target. We cannot repeat past mistakes.”7 Now fifteen years 
after the law was enacted, it is critical to examine Rep. Lee’s warning to inform future U.S foreign 
policy in the context of war powers and counterterrorism. Has 9/11 and the AUMF, like the Gulf 
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of Tonkin incident and resolution, been used to justify an “open-ended war with neither an exit 
strategy nor a focused target” for counterterrorism in the Middle East?  
The State of Exception in Counterterrorism 
 
Counterterrorism has undoubtedly become a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy in the 
Middle East. A great deal of U.S. strategy involves intelligence sharing with allies to kill top 
terrorists.8 Daniel Byman, Georgetown University professor and senior fellow at The Brookings 
Institution, argues that the Obama administration’s fixation on counterterrorism often leads the 
United States to miss broader regional trends that undermine our interests, and overlook 
opportunities to prevent or mitigate regional conflicts.9 According to Byman, “Counterterrorism 
not only explains where Obama has been aggressive; it also explains the limits of where he acts,” 
such as deploying force to fight al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, and the 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)10 within Syria rather than building those countries’ 
governance and defense capabilities. Moreover, Byman argues that the focus on counterterrorism 
inflates the threat that terrorism poses to U.S. interests by enflaming a cycle of violence. Threat 
inflation (often peddled by bellicose leaders) skews public opinion to favor costly action, even 
when such action may only threaten national security.  
To explain the AUMF’s mandate in relation to the phenomenon Byman describes, I turn to 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s framework from State of Exception for its fusion of political 
theory and philosophy in the context of executive power and national security. In reading a wide 
variety of national security related literature, I have found a stark dichotomy between legal and 
philosophical argumentation that scholars rarely bridge. This dichotomy reflects Michel 
Foucault’s observation that on the Right the problem of power is posed in juridical terms (e.g. 
constitution and sovereignty); on the Left power is posed in terms of the state apparatus (e.g. 
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culture and institutions).11 Bridging elements of both in a coherent theory allows us to better 
contextualize the impact of the AUMF. Using Agamben’s State of Exception is an inherently 
Foucauldian project, concerned with examining, “The way power was exercised—concretely, and 
in detail—with its specificity, its techniques and tactics.”12 Specifically, I will examine the 
“techniques and tactics” that the Obama administration has used to justify an expansion of 
executive power and the war on terror vis-à-vis the AUMF.  
 Agamben explains that leaders often use national emergencies to justify illegal expansions 
of their power. Such moves create a state of exception where law and praxis blur to a point in 
which the executive’s violent actions exist in a space unchecked by the law.13 In some instances, 
one can recognize states of exception fairly easily. For example, take the aftermath of the July 15, 
2016 attempted coup against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government. After the 
coup failed, Erdogan declared a state of emergency which granted him the authority to dismiss 
more than 100,000 public officials, detain 40,000 citizens, and arrest an additional 32,000.14 The 
Turkish President extended the state of emergency for an additional three months, which has 
enabled him to combat and reduce the power of political rivals across the country.15 Erdogan’s 
actions obviously exist within a state of exception, but other situations in which executives operate 
in a lawless vacuum are far less overt and comprehensible; many modern states of exception are 
less overt and impact fewer people personally. Yet this is not necessarily true in post-9/11 America, 
where the new security apparatus greatly impacts domestic social relations and foreign policy 
alike.  
Covert expansions of executive power within this apparatus represent the ambiguous space 
where the AUMF exists: “a space that is neither outside nor inside.”16 I will refer to this legal space 
as the “extra-legal,” where certain actions, though not necessarily directly against the law (illegal), 
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are in an ambiguous zone prone to exploitation by political actors. My argument is not that political 
actors should never interpret the law and instead cede all decisions to originalism, but that legal 
innovation only operates effectively when foundational Constitutional principles guide it. Thus, I 
will use Agamben’s framework to analyze the Obama administration’s deployment of the AUMF 
and determine if such deployment inadvertently justified a permanently escalating war that 
threatens U.S. national security. If the current application of the AUMF’s authority exists in an 
extra-legal zone that promotes executive overreach in foreign affairs, it may be inconsistent with 
our Constitutional principles.  
Presidential War Powers and the AUMF 
 
 Policymakers should first evaluate the AUMF debate within the context of the U.S. 
Constitution, because Article I gives Congress power to “provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States;17…declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and 
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;18 raise and support Armies;19…provide and 
maintain a Navy” and other specific duties. Article II positions the president as the “Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when 
called into the actual Service of the United States.”20 While the president has the authority to direct 
the armed forces once they are engaged in conflict, the Constitution does not grant the president 
the authority to initiate force unless Congress has permitted it. The Constitution reflects the 
founders’ belief that war is a collective decision to be checked and balanced by the republic,21 
because following the experience of tyrannical English rule, the founders rejected extensive 
executive power.22 Until the second half of the twentieth century, Congressional authorizations 
preceded executive military actions,23 a norm that changed in 1950 when Truman began American 
involvement in the Korean War via the United Nations. Although Congress recaptured its 
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traditional war making duty by passing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964, the Johnson and 
Nixon administrations applied the law at the expense of Congressional authority.  
With eerily similar language to the AUMF, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution stated  
That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take 
all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further 
aggression.24  
 
While President Johnson told Congress that “the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no 
wider war” the resolution provided the authority for a decade of U.S. military involvement in 
Vietnam intended to “bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression”25 without a 
declaration of war from Congress. In brief, Vietnam provoked massive backlash from civil society 
which led to the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1971 and passage of the War Powers 
Resolution (WPR) in 1973. The WPR has two key components: the 90-day limit, and the clear 
statement rule. First, sections 4(a)(1) and 5(b) limit the use of executive force to a maximum of 90 
days without an authorization from Congress; second, section 8(a)(1) states that the executive 
cannot infer Congressional approval without a specific statement authorizing such approval: 
silence is not consent.26 As a result of the WPR, the long shadow of Vietnam legally shapes all 
debates on the executive’s use of military force.  
After learning the lessons of Vietnam, Congress intended for the 2001 AUMF to 
“constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers 
Resolution” and noted that the new law does not supersede the WPR.27 But the age of fragmented 
terrorist networks and drone warfare places the WPR’s purpose—to keep war-making in Congress’ 
realm—in an ambiguous zone because the president now exercises more national security 
authority (e.g. through unilateral counterterrorism operations such as drone strikes).28 Given the 
debates in both the Vietnam and 9/11 eras, the 2001 AUMF begs important questions regarding 
how executive use of military force legally occurs. To begin, we must explore the development of 
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the AUMF under the Obama administration, because most of the law’s legal and practical 
development have occurred during Obama’s tenure. Curtis A. Bradley at Duke Law School and 
Jack L. Goldsmith at Harvard Law School, argue that  
almost every issue about the AUMF’s meaning and scope remained unresolved at the end of the Bush 
presidency. It was during Obama’s time in office, guided by his Administration, that courts construed the 
AUMF to resolve many of its ambiguities and uncertainties, and that Congress ratified the basic framework 
of these judicial interpretations.29 
 
Identifying the Obama administration’s “distinctive contributions made to AUMF jurisprudence,” 
Bradley and Goldsmith note is, “a necessary prerequisite to any normative assessment of the 
evolution of this body of law.”30  
Distinctive Contributions 
 
The Obama administration’s “distinctive contributions” occurred primarily in response to 
the global war on terror’s volatility. Terrorist groups in the Middle East have divided, fragmented, 
and coalesced to produce unpredictable results. Change has been driven partly by U.S. 
counterterrorism policy to eliminate important leaders and make alliances of convenience, but 
fragmentation has also occurred in response to social instability. For example, the U.S. alliance 
with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and resulting sectarian instability are the proximate 
causes of the rise of ISIL. Emma Sky, a British representative of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority in Kirkuk in 2003 and political advisor to U.S. General Ray Odierno from 2007-2010, 
argued that in 2013, President Obama “appeared to be paying scant attention to Maliki’s growing 
authoritarianism and the deteriorating situation in the country.”31 This inattention enabled Maliki 
to detain thousands of Sunnis without trial, push “leading Sunnis out of the political process by 
accusing them of terrorism, and [renege] on payments and pledges to the awakening members who 
had bravely fought al-Qaeda in Iraq…”32 As a result, ISIL was able to capitalize by claiming to be 
defenders of the Sunnis against the Shia Maliki government. While Sunni tribes previously 
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supported by the U.S. military, “had contained and defeated al-Qaeda in Iraq…those same tribes 
were cooperating with [ISIL] in a popular uprising against the central government…[because] they 
saw [ISIL] as the lesser of two evils when compared with Maliki.”33 In other words, the U.S. 
alliance with Maliki contributed to our misreading of formerly friendly Sunni tribes and led to a 
strengthened ISIL and Iraq’s unraveling.  
Before ISIL’s formal creation in 2013, several organizations established themselves as 
offshoots of al-Qa’ida. For example, AQAP formed in 2009 by merging al-Qa’ida branches in 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and the Somali group Al-Shabaab formally joined al-Qa’ida in 2012.34 
Thus, even before the emergence of ISIL, U.S. counterterrorism policy required significant 
flexibility to respond to the shifting landscape of al-Qa’ida operatives. In this context, it seems 
reasonable for the public to entrust the president with power to defend U.S. interests as 
circumstances change and groups such as ISIL fragment. This argument—rooted in the 
constitutional provision of the president as Commander in Chief—serves as a key premise in this 
debate and tacitly frames many of the Obama administration’s positions. Yet, before we explore 
the AUMF’s implications for ISIL today, we must explore the legal debate surrounding the AUMF.  
 The Obama administration has publicly detailed its interpretation of the AUMF in speeches 
and court briefings. Jeh Johnson, the Secretary of Homeland Security, delivered two speeches on 
the subject. When he was General Counsel of the Department of Defense in 2012, Johnson told 
Oxford University students how the fight against al-Qa’ida relies on “conventional legal principles 
found in treaties and customary international law,” despite the conflict’s unconventional nature. 
Citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court decision that established the legality of Guantanamo 
Bay detentions, Johnson noted that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict with al-
Qa’ida, thus, the international law of armed conflict applies.35 Similarly, when he was attorney 
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general, Eric Holder remarked in 2012 at Northwestern University that, “We are a nation at war. 
And…we face a nimble and determined enemy that cannot be underestimated.”36 Yet to many, the 
war on terror does not resemble war or “armed conflict”; it is fought in an ad hoc manner against 
multiple enemies instead of a singular state, American society has not been mobilized en masse,37 
and territorial boundaries of the conflict are unclear. Therefore, defining counterterrorism in terms 
of “armed conflict” seems contrived because it assumes parallels that do not exist.  
Since neither the Geneva Conventions nor subsequent developments in customary 
international law clearly define the term “armed conflict,”38 the Obama administration’s legal 
innovations placed counterterrorism operations under the laws of war. However, other countries 
differ as to whether terrorism counts as “armed conflict.” For example, when the United Kingdom 
and France ratified Article 1 (4) of an additional protocol to the Geneva Convention, they noted in 
a reservation that the term “armed conflict” is distinct from ordinary crimes, including acts of 
terrorism, whether they are isolated or part of a concerted effort.39 This reservation was informed 
by the argument that “The Troubles,” a tumultuous time in Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1998 
that killed 3,600 and injured over 50,000,40 was not an “armed conflict.” Although the United 
States did not concur and the reservation is not binding, the reservation is significant for at least 
three reasons.  
First, the reservation makes Johnson’s portrayal of international consensus on the laws of 
war problematic; not all countries believe in the Obama administration’s premise that acts of 
terrorism trigger the law of armed conflict. As a result, Obama administration officials’ statements 
seem less credible and universal. Second, if the British and French interpretation were binding, it 
would remove key premises based on international law that the United States depends upon to 
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conduct counterterrorism operations legally. One example of this international legal dependency 
is the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hamdi. The court concluded that 
detention is authorized is based on the necessary and appropriate force language of the AUMF. It is been 
long recognized that preventive detention for the duration of the act of hostilities on a traditional battle field 
is a necessary and appropriate incident of war.41  
 
The Supreme Court’s justification for deeming detentions legal is that detaining enemies during 
war is standard international practice, thereby centralizing international laws of war in the 
decision’s reasoning.42 Yet without the premise that the U.S. is at war with al-Qa’ida (which the 
court determined), the U.S. could not apply the international law of armed conflict. As a result, all 
actions that derive legality from the law of armed conflict (e.g. the conditions for detention to be 
legal at Guantanamo Bay which the Supreme Court affirmed in Hamdi) would be illegal if this 
premise did not exist.  
Third, the United Kingdom’s interpretation stems from terrorist attacks on home soil that 
are very similar to attacks and conditions that the United States has experienced. Neither the Irish 
Republican Army nor al-Qa’ida are states, the conflicts in both countries continued for an extended 
period of time, and both conflicts greatly impacted their respective societies. Given these 
circumstances, it would not be unreasonable for the United States to adopt the United Kingdom’s 
interpretation and deem acts of terrorism distinct from “armed conflict.” But there are notable 
differences: the U.S. fight is international; the actors’ demands and capabilities are different; the 
defense mechanisms are different. Thus, the Obama administration’s deployment of the law of 
armed conflict innovated in an underdetermined area of law. In this area, Eric A. Posner at the 
University of Chicago, argues that  
the US should not consider itself governed by the laws of war in its conflict with al Qaeda, as they are 
normally understood, but it should be alert for opportunities for creating implicit norms of conduct that serve 
the American interest.43  
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Since the law is sufficiently ambiguous, it can be appropriated for a wide range of legal purposes. 
Yet while extensive executive power serves short term security interests, deference to the 
executive neglects the Constitution and civil liberties in the long term. Given these facts, will post-
9/11 counterterrorism efforts always be considered part of an “armed conflict”?  
The Tipping Point 
 
Jeh Johnson, clarifying the parameters of counterterrorism, acknowledged that the conflict 
against terrorists will eventually lose the status of “armed conflict.” He stated that there will come  
a tipping point at which so many of the leaders and operatives of al Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed 
or captured, and the group is no longer able to attempt or launch a strategic attack against the United States, 
such that al Qaeda as we know it, the organization that our Congress authorized the military to pursue in 
2001, has been effectively destroyed.44  
 
At the tipping point, Johnson reasons that American efforts could no longer be considered part of 
an “‘armed conflict’ against al Qaeda and its associated forces; rather, a counterterrorism effort 
against individuals who are the scattered remnants of al Qaeda, or are parts of groups unaffiliated 
with al Qaeda…in cooperation with the international community…”45 Once counterterrorism 
efforts no longer comprise “armed conflict” (which means that they do not fall under international 
humanitarian law) international criminal law could be deployed to prosecute terrorism.  
Specifically, the international community could draw upon jurisprudence from the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) to prosecute terrorism. The STL, a tribunal formed by a 2007 treaty 
between the United Nations and Lebanon to prosecute the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks that 
killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri, offers several important contributions to 
counterterrorism after the tipping point. First, the STL exercises jurisdiction solely over domestic 
crimes, and is the first international tribunal to do so.46 This arrangement was created as a 
compromise intended to safeguard the physical tribunal (by placing it in The Hague) due to 
Lebanon’s instability, while also legitimizing Lebanese law. Thus, the STL set a precedent for 
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international tribunals to prosecute terrorism in unstable countries. Second, the STL provides 
jurisprudence to internationalize the Lebanese definition of terrorism which helped to “fill the gaps 
in the evolving definition of terrorism as an international crime.”47 As a result, the international 
community has a more stable body of law to prosecute terrorism under international criminal law. 
Third, the STL established clearer jurisprudence for the international courts to deal with terrorism. 
The International Criminal Court, or a new court developed exclusively to prosecute terrorism 
cases, could provide a neutral forum that is distanced from nation-level conflict (as existed in 
Lebanon). Further, such a court could provide a solution to terrorism cases where several states 
have overlapping jurisdiction.48 But this scenario is contingent upon the end of terrorism as “armed 
conflict,” and the consent of states to cede jurisdiction to international courts. Such concessions 
are unlikely given growing hostility to international institutions like the International Criminal 
Court.49 Moreover, the United States is unlikely to declare the end of “armed conflict” any time 
soon because that assumption provides the needed legal cover of international humanitarian law.  
It is unclear if the conflict against al-Qa’ida and its associated forces will ever end. Given the 
conflict’s unconventional and inherently asymmetric nature, it is more likely that terrorist groups 
will continue to adapt rather than formally stop fighting. For this reason, the United States can 
reasonably claim that an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida and affiliates will exist indefinitely. 
Officials may never transition to international criminal law so that they can maintain the authority 
to use military force. James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, recently told the Senate 
Armed Services Committee that al-Qa’ida affiliates “have proven resilient and are positioned to 
make gains” despite counterterrorism efforts that have degraded the leadership in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.50 Thus, there is neither a consensus on how the war on terror could end, nor transition 
strategy for when the tipping point arrives. As a result, the United States is likely to be engaged in 
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a long-term conflict where strategy is built on the threat-inflating assumption of “armed conflict.” 
Threat inflation can result in hawkish interventions against fragmented forces that are at best 
tangentially associated with al-Qa’ida, creating a cycle that fuels violence and executive overreach.  
Fragmentation and Associated Forces 
 
Examining the fragmentation of al-Qa’ida first requires understanding the significance of 
an “associated force,” and how the Obama administration deploys the term. In 2012, Jeh Johnson 
defined an “associated force” by two characteristics: “(1) an organized, armed group that has 
entered the fight alongside al Qaeda, and (2) is a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners.”51 However, the Executive Branch initially presented 
the reasoning of “associated force” in the 2009 D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals case Al-Bihani v. 
Obama, a case concerning a Yemeni Guantanamo detainee who appealed the denial of his petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus.52 Given that “associated forces” was not included in the original 
AUMF, Al-Bihani v. Obama was the first time that the government considered the phrase in public. 
The administration decided to present the phrase to legally account for the fragmentation of al-
Qa’ida. The court did not contest the phrase, and chose to defer to the administration’s definition. 
Since the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has the authority to review acts of the federal government 
(even before Congress provided it with special jurisdiction in 1962), the panel’s decision set a 
precedent.53 The decision effectively added “associated forces” to the AUMF’s original defensive 
mandate to go after the “nations, organizations, or persons…[who] planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001.”54 The court’s deference 
to the executive’s interpretation was a de-facto seal of approval that the administration would 
summon for legitimacy, although the definition of “associated forces” was never debated in 
Congress nor contested by the court. 
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Yet at the same time the court supported the validity of “associated forces,” it contradicted 
the administration’s justification for using the phrase. The theory behind “associated forces” is the 
concept of “co-belligerency” from the international law of neutrality.55 Under the law of neutrality, 
“states engaged in an international armed conflict are allowed to consider third-party states as co-
belligerents of the enemy and thus subject to attack.”56 Before attacking suspected co-belligerents, 
third-party states must be given a chance to declare their neutrality before they can be declared 
enemies.57 Al-Bihani argued that because he was not given a chance to declare his neutrality, he 
was unlawfully detained under the laws of war.58 The court rejected Al-Bihani’s arguments with 
two rebuttals. First, the court argued that the doctrine of co-belligerency, which was derived from 
outdated notions of state-centric international relations, could not be applied to a world defined by 
non-state actors. Deploying the concept today would require false equivalencies because states no 
longer occupy the same space in the world. Second, the court argued that Congress never intended 
the international laws of war bind the AUMF: 
There is no indication in the AUMF, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005…or the MCA of 2006 or 2009, that 
Congress intended the international laws of war to act as extra-textual limiting principles for the President’s 
war powers under the AUMF. The international laws of war as a whole have not been implemented 
domestically by Congress and are therefore not a source of authority for U.S. courts.59 
 
If the court found “no indication” in the relevant laws “that Congress intended the international 
laws of war to act as extra-textual limiting principles for the President’s war powers under the 
AUMF,” the president cannot legitimately use international law to justify his actions. Ironically, 
in the process of attempting to grant the executive more authority, the court’s ruling did the 
opposite by dashing the legitimacy of the Executive Branch’s deployment of international law. 
The court’s arguments stand at odds with Jeh Johnson and Eric Holder’s arguments that utilize 
international law as key premises for U.S. military force.60 It also contradicts the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Hamdi, which used international laws of war to justify the detention of enemy 
  Collinger 
 
 15 
combatants. Further, when the court denied en banc review, they stated “the panel’s discussion of 
[the relevance of international-law-of-war principles to the AUMF] is not necessary to the 
disposition of the merits,”61 which reaffirmed the idea that international law was not a source of 
authority for U.S. courts.62 The court’s ruling on the significance of international law for the 
AUMF explains why the Supreme Court denied the case certiorari; the justices thought that the 
lower court settled the laws in question.63 In other words, the courts agreed that the source of the 
president’s authority vis-à-vis the AUMF was not from international law, even if international laws 
of war apply to conduct elsewhere. And since “associated forces” had not been debated by 
Congress, the administration’s actions existed in an extra-legal zone unregulated by both 
international and domestic law.  
Let us assume that international law in this case is authoritative so that we can examine 
how the Obama administration deploys the concept of co-belligerency. Jens D. Ohlin at Cornell 
explains two problems with applying co-belligerency and the international laws of neutrality to the 
war on terror. First, it is unclear how the required provision for third-party states to publicly declare 
their neutrality applies to individual terrorists such as Al-Bihani. Ohlin notes that suspected 
terrorists “are not given the formal opportunity to declare their neutrality, nor are they given a 
conventional form of notice that they are being declared a co-belligerent of Al Qaeda”64 before 
being attacked. Second, applying co-belligerency to non-state terrorist networks assumes 
homogeneity in goals and methods. While two groups may both be fighting against the United 
States, they could also be fighting each other. This exact dilemma occurred when al-Qa’ida’s 
Syrian affiliate, Nusra Front, started to compete with ISIL.65 While both ISIL and al-Qa’ida want 
an Islamic state, they are fighting against each other for territory in Syria. Charles Lister, a Senior 
Fellow at the Middle East Institute, explained that  
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the Islamic State’s proclamation of a caliphate in June 2014 posed a substantial challenge to the jihadi 
credibility of Nusra Front, which until that moment had controlled no territory unilaterally, frequently 
cooperated with nationalist forces to govern areas, and was only imposing a bare minimum of sharia law.66 
  
In other words, the groups have different goals and methods despite fighting the same enemy. The 
nature of the conflict and actors involved renders the international law of neutrality obsolete, 
thereby removing the legitimacy of the “co-belligerency” rationale for “associated forces”  
However, Congress included “associated forces” within section 1034 of the Fiscal Year 
2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).67 The bill states that Congress “supports the 
Executive Branch’s interpretation” of “associated forces” provided in a 2009 filing before the D.C. 
District Court in Al-Bihani v. Obama. Yet that interpretation provides little guidance as to what 
“associated forces” means, or how government should apply it. In fact, the administration’s filing 
dodged both questions:  
It is neither possible nor advisable, however, to attempt to identify, in the abstract, the precise nature and 
degree of “substantial support,” or the precise characteristics of “associated forces,” that are or would be 
sufficient to bring persons and organizations within the foregoing framework.68  
 
In other words, the Executive Branch kept the definition and application of both terms vague so 
that they could apply them flexibly. Rep. Howard Berman, a Democrat from California, and Rep. 
Chris Van Holen, a Democrat from Maryland, excoriated Congress for considering section 1034 
without specifically defining “associated forces,” and not holding a single hearing on the matter.69 
Robert M. Chesney at the University of Texas and Former Advisor to the Detainee Policy Task 
Force, explained to the House Armed Services Committee why the inclusion of “associated forces” 
is problematic. Since,  
Section 1034 does not define “associated forces,” …this issue would remain as problematic under 1034 as it 
does under the current AUMF… [because] we would still lack a clear metric as to when an affiliated or 
related entity becomes an ‘associated force’ of al Qaeda.70  
 
Chesney extended this argument in 2013 (unsatisfied by the administration’s clarifications in 
speeches) by stating that the administration’s approach is ambiguous because it does not outline  
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the initial question of how to determine whether a particular group is part of al Qaeda to begin with, bearing 
in mind the fragmentation trend. And it also will be of little use if and when we reach the point that al Qaeda 
itself is effectively destroyed, thus removing the predicate for a co [-] belligerency type of analysis.71  
 
This ambiguity may cause administration officials to make decisions about which groups fall under 
the AUMF without the consent of Congress. Acting on such decisions would exploit the AUMF’s 
authority at the expense of the separation of powers in the name of national security.  
Stephen Preston, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, demonstrated the 
concrete implications of this deference to the executive when he testified to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in 2014. Preston explained;  
the determination that a particular group is an ‘associated force’ is made at the most senior levels of the U.S. 
Government, following reviews by senior government lawyers and informed by departments and agencies 
with relevant expertise and institutional roles, including all-source intelligence from the U.S. intelligence 
community.72  
 
It is undoubtable that one’s analysis of this issue would be different if he/she were privy to 
classified information. Within this context, it becomes clear that the way the executive decides to 
strike “associated forces” is unilateral. The decision making process that Preston described 
exemplifies William B. Quandt’s analysis of how “bureaucratic politics” can impact a president’s 
foreign policy: competing organizations and the sometimes-unreliable flow of information make 
policy outcomes unpredictable.73 As a result, the process by which a group is determined to be an 
“associated force” is opaque and likely to generate unpredictable results, especially in the era of 
drone warfare.74 Therefore, the status quo incentivizes an exploitation of the AUMF because the 
administration’s control of the law is unchecked by Congress.  
This episode demonstrates that the definition of and justification for “associated forces” 
exerts the “force of law without law.”75 If international laws are not applicable, but the executive’s 
reasoning is contingent on those laws, and the court and Congress still defer to the executive’s 
definition, it is applying no law except that which was generated by the executive. The courts and 
Congress effectively allowed the executive to declare war against an indefinite set of groups 
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without the specific consent of Congress—the only federal government branch that the U.S. 
Constitution endows with war making authority76—by deferring critical legal questions about the 
nature of “associated forces”. The courts likely deferred because they viewed the definition as 
something for the political branches to determine; Congress deferred due to gridlock produced by 
differing views on war powers. But if Congress continues to defer to the executive in this manner, 
the results could be an unchecked expansion of the war on terror. The fragmentation al-Qa’ida and 
the emergence of ISIL as a result creates instances for U.S. presidents to exploit the ambiguity of 
“associated forces” and fight without Congressional authorization for extended periods of time. 
Is ISIL an Associated Force of Al-Qa’ida? 
 
A September 2014 leaked document from the Obama administration provides background 
on ISIL’s complex formation and emergence. In 2003, a group called Jama’at al-Tawhid w’al-
Jihad, which was led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, merged with al-Qa’ida.77 Although bin Laden 
and al-Zarqawi met in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 1999,78 it was not until 2004 that al-Zarqawi 
officially pledged his group’s allegiance to bin Laden and became al-Qa’ida’s leader in Iraq 
(AQI).79 After a U.S. airstrike killed al-Zarqawi in 2006, his successor Abu Ayyub al-Masri (who 
worked in the same group as al-Zarqawi in the 1980s) rebranded AQI as the Islamic State of Iraq 
(ISI), and focused on exporting terror globally. Not long thereafter, al-Masri reaffirmed his bayah, 
or oath of loyalty, to bin Laden, and also pledged to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi—his partner in ISI. 
Al-Masiri wanted to retain ties to AQI while exploring a secession so that he could lead an 
independent group. As Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan analyzed, “In jihadist terms, this was 
like taking a mistress and presenting her as your second wife to your first.”80 In retrospect, al-
Masiri’s decision to pledge his loyalty to two organizations foreshadowed the severance between 
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ISIL and al-Qa’ida. After both al-Masri and al-Baghdadi were killed in an April 2010 U.S.-Iraqi 
operation, the severance process began.  
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took the leadership of ISI following his predecessors’ death, and in 
2011 he assigned ISI member Muhammad al-Jolani to begin an operation in Syria known as the 
Nusra Front.81 In April 2013, al-Baghdadi announced the official merger between the two 
organizations under one name, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [ISIL].82 This decision 
catalyzed a major dispute between the newly formed group and al-Qa’ida. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the 
current leader of al-Qa’ida, disavowed both groups in a statement via Al Jazeera. Al-Zawahiri 
argued that Al-Baghdadi was, “wrong when he announced the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
without asking permission or receiving advice from us and even without notifying us,” and al-
Jolani was “wrong by announcing his rejection to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, and by 
showing his links to al-Qaeda without having our permission or advice, even without notifying 
us.”83 Essentially, al-Zawahiri “‘dissolved’ ISIS and ordered both ISI and al-Nusra back to [their] 
geographically delimited corners, one having control over Iraq, the other over Syria.”84 Al-
Baghdadi defied the order by critiquing al-Zawahiri’s deference to the West’s artificial state 
borders from Sykes-Picot.85 Al-Baghdadi’s statement delegitimized al-Zawahiri’s claim as the 
leader of global jihadism and signaled an important ideological shift. In response, al-Qa’ida 
formally severed from ISIL in February 2014: “ISIS is not a branch of [al-Qa’ida], we have no 
organizational relationship with it, and [we] are not responsible for its actions.”86 This statement 
reflected the distance between the groups and catalyzed conflict.  
Since their official split in 2014, ISIL and al-Qa’ida have been in conflict and competition 
for territory, legitimacy, and the identity of global jihadism. But ISIL was already functionally 
independent from al-Qa’ida before the official split.87 ISIL’s declaration of the Islamic caliphate 
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simply, “proclaimed that all previous loyalties were voided” and demanded global jihadi groups 
to swear loyalty to al-Baghdadi, thereby upending the al-Qa’ida’s affiliate structure.88 The Obama 
administration argues that this split  
does not remove ISIL from coverage under the 2001 AUMF because ISIL continues to wage the conflict 
against the United States that it entered into when, in 2004, it joined with bin Laden and al-Qa’ida in their 
conflict against the United States.89  
 
But this reasoning assumes that ISIL was fully constituted as the same group, with the same 
ideological goals, leadership and similarities to al-Qa’ida at the time and since 2004. But as I have 
outlined, there are and were significant differences from the very beginning (e.g. functional 
independence, different leadership, contrasting methods) that should require a different approach.  
Not only did ISIL upend the previous affiliate structure, the three fundamental ways that 
the group differs (both then and now) from its predecessor demonstrate why it is difficult to 
consider them “associated forces.” First, they oppose each other’s approach to the creation of an 
Islamic caliphate. ISIL believes that military liberation should precede an ideological 
transformation; al-Qa’ida believe the opposite.90 Divergent ideological stances explain why al-
Qa’ida split from ISIL immediately after ISIL declared a caliphate, and speaks to a deep religious 
difference between the groups. While al-Qa’ida’s strategy, ideology, and messaging were 
“predicated on the expectation that it would not take power,” ISIL rejected this as defeatism and 
tried to implement their vision immediately.91 Not only do they have completely different 
ideological approaches, they are now fighting each other in Syria. Second, the threat from ISIL is 
completely different than that of al-Qa’ida. Audrey K. Cronin at George Mason University, in an 
article titled “ISIS is Not a Terrorist Group,” went as far as to say that ISIL “is not an outgrowth 
or a part of the older radical Islamist organization, nor does it represent the next phase in its 
evolution.”92 Since ISIL behaves more like a “pseudo-state led by a conventional army,” the 
strategies that have contained al-Qa’ida, which acts more like a guerilla force, will not stop ISIL.93 
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It is possible that the international counterterrorism will degrade ISIL to a point at which the group 
can be fought as a guerilla force and prosecuted under international criminal law. But for the time 
being, the U.S. requires an entirely new strategic framework—military and legal—to combat the 
new threat. The stark differences between ISIL and al-Qa’ida disqualify the two as “associated 
forces” or “co-belligerents” (terms which the courts rejected the international legal basis for) and 
demonstrate that Washington requires a new military and legal strategy to account for a change.  
The Extra-Legal War 
 
Despite immense changes in the terror network’s ideologies and capabilities, the AUMF is 
still construed as the operative framework for the war on ISIL. The Obama administration does 
not believe that the president loses authority to fight ISIL vis-à-vis the AUMF, 
simply because of differences between the group and al-Qa’ida’s current leadership. A contrary interpretation 
of the statute would allow al-Qa’ida and its co-belligerents—rather than the U.S. President and Congress—
to control the scope of the AUMF by splintering into rival factions while still continuing to prosecute their 
same conflict against the United States.94  
 
Rather than ceding the terms of conflict to terrorists because of cursory leadership squabbles, the 
administration argues, the president and Congress should dictate the terms. But as detailed above, 
it is clear that the two groups have differences that extend far further than the leadership. Moreover, 
Congress does not currently control the scope of the AUMF. The administration’s notion that a 
contrary interpretation would incentivize groups to split into rival factions to control the scope of 
the AUMF is misguided; if anything, a contrary interpretation would allow congress to control the 
scope of the law by requiring new legislation to account for changing terror networks. The 
administration’s argument neglects the fact that groups only split when fundamental ideological 
differences exist (e.g. how a caliphate is to be declared). It is not practical or in the best interests 
of the groups to split into infinite factions. If they did so, the groups would lose fighting power 
and the ability to draw on a larger network. The split of ISIL from al-Qa’ida is distinct from 
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factions forming branches to carry out the mission of the group at large; the latter indicates true 
association and ideological alignment, while former does not. Third, ISIL’s military might makes 
it a completely different enemy from al-Qa’ida. These are reasons why al-Qa’ida affiliates and 
ISIL should remain distinct in U.S. policy and indicate that the war on terror has evolved faster 
than the legal basis on which it is fought.  
President Obama tacitly distanced the fight against ISIL from the 2001 AUMF when he 
presented a new AUMF to address ISIL in February 2015.95 Obama explained that although he 
believes that existing statutes provide enough authority, a new authorization would provide 
flexibility to utilize special operations to eliminate ISIL’s leaders. Obama was committed to 
“refine, and ultimately repeal, the 2001 AUMF” and pointed out the need to more specifically 
tailor the 2001 AUMF’s authority to fit the present conflict.96 In other words, Obama recognized 
the ambiguity of applying the 2001 AUMF to the conflict against ISIL. Secretary of State John 
Kerry echoed this sentiment to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by framing his argument 
for a new AUMF as “a clear and formal expression of this Congress's backing at this moment” to 
“dispel doubts that might exist anywhere that Americans are united in this effort.”97 Congress’ 
constitutional duty demands a debate on the proposal. 
Since Obama’s proposal has not yet left committee, there has been no such formal 
expression of Congressional backing. As a direct result, U.S. Army Captain Nathan Smith, an 
intelligence officer stationed in Kuwait, challenged the legality of the war against ISIL. Given that 
the president did not receive specific authorization from Congress for his actions against ISIL 
within 90 days, Smith argues that the fight against ISIL is illegal under the WPR. An amicus curiae 
brief submitted for Smith by Michael J. Glennon, a Professor of International Law at the Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, succinctly rebuts the Obama administration’s 
  Collinger 
 
 23 
case on the WPR’s clear statement and 90 day rules.98 And given the court’s reasoning in 
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, Glennon argued that Smith’s case could not be considered 
a political question in the exclusive domain of the executive. In Zivotofsky, the court reasoned that 
if it abdicated its responsibility to determine whether a statute was constitutional, it would transfer 
that authority to the executive and upend the separation of powers. If the court defers to the 
executive in this case, the court could consent to vast new executive war powers without 
Congressional approval.  
While Glennon presents a convincing case, he misses one key point. The Obama 
administration can claim that Congress authorized war against ISIL when it passed the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 2012 and included the phrase “al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated 
forces,” which it now construes to also include ISIL. Chesney’s analysis about the ambiguity of 
applying this phrase, which I have detailed above, demonstrates a violation of the WPR’s clear 
statement rule. First, the clear statement rule requires application from a specific resolution 
(“associated forces” was not in the original 2001 AUMF) and that the statue authorize force with 
respect to a particular conflict. Second, the clear statement rule also prohibits the executive from 
inferring a clear statement from “any provision contained in any appropriation Act” when that 
provision does not authorize the introduction of U.S. forces into conflict.99 Since the sole 
legislation that affirmed “associated forces” (where ISIL fits) comes from an appropriations act 
(the NDAA of 2012), the term cannot be construed as Congressional authorization against ISIL 
under the WPR. Therefore, the Obama administration has violated the WPR, placing anti-ISIL 
operations in an ambiguous extra-legal zone, neither inside nor outside the law, due to judicial and 
legislative deference. The administration’s actions come under the force of law when the courts 
and Congress say that they are illegal.100  
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Conclusion 
 
If Congress and the courts permit such ambiguity to continue, it will enable a more hawkish 
administration to, as Rep. Lee said, continue an open-ended war “with neither an exit strategy nor 
a focused target.” Given president-elect Trump’s bellicosity and propensity to appoint foreign 
policy advisers that subscribe to an extreme version of the “clash of civilizations” theory,101 which 
will enflame the war on terror on both sides, Congress must reclaim its power to check the 
executive. Congress can do so by passing a specific authorization that provides flexibility to fight 
terrorism without sacrificing constitutional principles and risking the lives of American 
servicemen and women.102 In the same way that contrived legal interpretations enabled 
unpredictable events, it is impossible to predict how future administrations may continue the 
current state of exception. Since only access to classified materials could fully answer the original 
question of this paper, it is difficult to completely assess exactly how law was or was not applied. 
Yet, this is precisely my argument: the state of exception operates covertly, wherein,  
The normative aspect of law can…be obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental violence 
that—while ignoring international law externally and producing a permanent state of exception internally—
nevertheless still claims to be applying the law.103 
 
Inaction on the AUMF will enable future administrations to justify overreach in the Middle East 
or elsewhere at the expense of U.S. national security, international norms and Constitutional 
imperatives while still claiming legality. Such action will set dangerous precedents that eviscerate 
the separation of powers to create an infinite state of exception. Congress must make the case that 
the executive is no longer applying the law and force a new debate to reclaim control of the war 
on terror. Congress must prevent the United States from enflaming terrorism, neglecting strategic 
objectives, and inflicting further damage upon our Democracy. 
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